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Our life is built around coordinating efforts with others. This usually involves 
incentivizing others to do things, and sustaining our relationship with them. Using the 
wrong incentives backfires: it lowers effort and tarnishes our relationships. But what 
constitutes a ‘wrong’ incentive? And can incentives be used to shape relationships in a 
desired manner? To address these and other questions, we introduce relational 
incentives theory, which distinguishes between two aspects of incentives: schemes 
(how the incentive is used) and means (what is used as an incentive). Prior research 
has focused on means (e.g., monetary vs. non-monetary incentives). Our theory 
highlights the importance of schemes, with a focus on how they interact with social 
relationships. It posits that the efficacy of incentives depends largely on whether the 
scheme fits the relational structure of the persons involved in the activity: participation 
incentive schemes for communal sharing relations, hierarchy for authority ranking 
relations, balancing for equality matching relations, and proportional incentive schemes 
for market pricing relations. We show that these four schemes comprise some of the 
most prevalent variants of incentives. We then discuss the antecedents and 
consequences of the use of congruent and incongruent incentive schemes. We argue 
that congruent incentives can reinforce the relationship. Incongruent incentives disrupt 
relational motives, which undermines the coordinating relationship and reduces effort. 




relational model. The theory thus contributes to research on relational models by 
showing how people constitute and modulate relationships. It adds to the incentives and 
contracting literatures by offering a framework for analyzing the structural congruence 
between incentives and relationships, yielding predictions about the effects of incentives 
across different organizational and individual-level contexts. 
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Imagine that you play in a band and have an important performance coming up. One of 
the band members has fallen ill and you urgently need to find a replacement. How do 
you motivate another person to fill in? You could offer to pay her per hour of practice 
and performance. Alternatively, you could give her a gift such as a record of your band’s 
music. Which incentive is best? The answer depends on the relationship you have with 
the person. The gift makes no sense if the person is a stranger who is a professional 
musician. The proportional payment is likely to backfire if the person is your friend; she 
would probably be offended. The point is simple: the existing relationship determines 
which incentive works best.  
 
Incongruence between the incentive and the underlying relationship is usually 
counterproductive: it is likely to lead to reduced effort, and it may tarnish the 
relationship. However, incongruent incentivizing can also be used to shift the 
relationship to a new mode. Suppose your band permanently onboarded a new 
member. Initially you offered the new hire the smallest share of the proceeds, reflecting 
her junior position in the group hierarchy. After a year, you decide to change the 
incentive scheme. You might decide to split the proceeds evenly among all band 
members, thus initiating a shift to a ‘peer-based’ group structure. Or you might offer to 
pool the proceeds in a fund from which you will pay for joint activities, thus shifting 
towards a communal relationship. Alternatively, you could decide that everyone gets 
paid in proportion to the number of pieces they play in, thus creating a market-like 
exchange. These examples illustrate that the choice of the incentive scheme shapes 
people’s relationships, and that a switch in incentive schemes can induce a shift to a 
new relational model.  
 
We introduce a mapping between incentives and social relationships that makes it 
possible to study their interactions in a systematic and straightforward way. There are 
four relational models that characterize the structures of social coordination across 




market pricing (Fiske 1991, 1992). Since incentivizing is part of a relationship, we 
propose that each relational model has a congruent incentive scheme: participation, 
hierarchy, balancing, and proportionality incentives, respectively. These four schemes 
encompass the most prevalent variants of incentives (e.g., long-term employment, 
discretionary incentives, revenue sharing, and piece rates). 
 
With this theory of congruence of incentive schemes to relational models, we also 
propose to re-conceptualize incentives, distinguishing between schemes (how the 
incentive is used) and means (what is being used as an incentive). Much of the prior 
research on incentives has focused on the effects of different means, particularly the 
distinction between monetary and non-monetary means. In contrast, we argue that the 
schemes may be even more important for determining when incentives function well, 
and when they have unintended effects on effort and the relationship. If you give 
volunteers money (e.g., a gift card), it is not the use of money per se that backfires; 
what offends the volunteers is if they perceive that you are using a proportional scheme 
(e.g., $12 per 30 minutes of help) in a communal sharing relationship – where 
proportional incentives are incongruent. In the introductory example, your friend may 
well accept getting a few extra dollars as a ‘gift’ for her participation, without an adverse 
effect on her relational or task motivation. Conversely, even the non-monetary ‘gift’ of a 
record for your friend would probably backfire if you used it in an explicitly proportional 
scheme, say, five records per day of work. It is the schemes, not the means, that 
determine congruence with social relationships. 
 
Our theory contributes to research on incentives by offering a clear framework for 
studying incentives in social context, focusing on the interactions between incentives 
and relationships. We consider how congruence vs. incongruence of incentive schemes 
mediates the effects of incentives on effort, engagement, and commitment to the social 
relationship. Our theory contributes to relational models theory by showing how people 




coordinate a given activity. This adds an important account of agentic dynamic process 
that research on relational models theory has heretofore lacked.  
 
Our paper proceeds as follows: Part 1 introduces the four incentive schemes and lays 
out how they respectively correspond to the four relational models. It also covers prior 
literature on incentives, showing that researchers in different fields of the social 
sciences have repeatedly and independently observed variants of these four 
fundamental incentive schemes. Part 2 describes the conditions under which people 
use congruent or incongruent incentives, explains when others accept or reject them, 
and with what effects. It discusses empirical evidence for these antecedents and 
consequences, and it sets out testable propositions. Part 3 presents the potential of 
relational incentives theory to illuminate questions as wide-ranging as how persons sort 
into activities, organizations, and occupations; why entrepreneurs often choose even 
equity splits; why contracts are often incomplete; and the limiting case of our theory, 
which is when the relationship itself becomes a sufficient incentive. We end with a brief 
discussion of the long-term consequences of incentive schemes.  
1. Incentives: Schemes and Means 
We use the terms “incentives” and “incentivizing” to designate a person’s or group’s 
attempt to induce another person to do something by modifying the target’s motives or 
sentiments. This includes the use of resources (e.g., money), or language, gestures and 
other forms of communication (e.g., a form of address or a hug symbolizing inclusion in 
the group). We theorize that the crucial aspect of incentivizing is how it is done: the 
scheme. The scheme refers to the structure of the incentive, as perceived by the people 
involved. The scheme determines if an incentive is congruent with the predominant 
relationship structure, that is, the relational model. Thus, we use the term “relationship” 
or “relation” not in the colloquial sense of friendship or loving relations, but in the 
technical sense of socially coordinated activity in which the participants are generating 




goals, and experiencing emotions with reference to the same culturally implemented 
cognitive model. 
1.1 The four fundamental incentive schemes 
There are four relational models that humans use to structure their coordination in 
virtually all domains and cultures, throughout history: communal sharing, authority 
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing (Fiske, 1991, 1992; Haslam, 2004a).  
 
Incentivizing is a central aspect of social coordination. We therefore argue that it, too, is 
structured according to the four fundamental relational models that are used for all 
human coordination. To show this mapping between incentives and relationships, we 
first describe each relational model and then introduce the incentive scheme that is 
congruent with it.  
Participation incentive schemes in communal sharing relations 
Communal sharing relationships are ones in which people feel that in respect to what 
they are coordinating, they are the same. They are socially equivalent in the sense that 
what they do and what they get is not individually differentiated. People belong to many 
communal sharing relationships, being equivalent in some respects to fellow members 
in a work group, in other respects to members of the same family, hometown, or 
gender. The relational motive generating communal sharing is the need for unity (also 
called the ‘need to belong,’ ‘affiliation motivation,’ or ‘intimacy motivation’). 
 
The incentive schemes that are congruent with communal sharing relationships are 
what we call participation incentives. These consist of acts and expressions of inclusion 
in the group, given for making a sincere effort to participate, regardless of the amount or 
quality of the contribution. Participation incentives establish an equivalence relation, 
indicating that what the person did makes them a member of the group – they are just 
the same as us (in this respect and context, at least). This may entitle them to take any 




in the relationship will look out for them – without any actual rights to take resources, or 
without involving any resources at all. Examples are offering free food to everyone who 
shows up to donate blood, regardless of the quantity of blood donated and irrespective 
of whether the donation attempt is successful; a hug that greets family members arriving 
at a reunion; or a particular form of address like the custom of Communist Party 
members to address each other as “comrade” – each of which makes the recipient ‘one’ 
with the others. 
Hierarchy incentive schemes in authority ranking relations 
Authority ranking relationships consist of asymmetrical relations in which persons are 
ordered in a hierarchy. Subordinates owe deference, respect, and sometimes 
obedience to their superiors, who have a pastoral responsibility to guide, lead, and 
stand up for their subordinates. Authority ranking is created and sustained by the need 
for hierarchy (also called ‘power motivation’).  
 
The congruent incentive schemes are what we call hierarchy incentives, which consist 
of discretionary rewards bestowed by the incentivizer in a way that symbolizes the 
superior’s legitimate authority.1 Hierarchy schemes also consist of acts and expressions 
of rank that place the incentivized in a linear ordering. Examples of hierarchy incentives 
are discretionary promotions and awards or insignia and accoutrements of ordinal 
status (e.g., getting an office on the executive floor, being crowned).  
Balancing incentive schemes in equality matching relations  
Equality matching relationships consist of keeping track of what one gives and gets, 
with even balance as the reference point. A specific equality motivation undergirds 
these relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011).  
 
 
1 While all incentive schemes may involve ‘discretion’, we use the term to indicate that the superior has legitimate 




Balancing incentives are the congruent incentive schemes. These consist of acts and 
expressions that make the recipient even with others in the group. To balance is not to 
be equivalent, not to be the same. It is to be on the same level, to be equal in the sense 
of being evenly matched. Examples include egalitarian wages where everyone is paid 
the same, office rotations, or random allocations of parking spots, giving everyone the 
same chance of getting the most coveted reward. In contrast to participation incentives, 
a balancing scheme gives each person a discrete reward that exactly matches what 
each other person is getting (simultaneously, in turn, or in expectation if a lottery is 
used). In a participation scheme, the reward is not divided into assigned portions; it is 
treated as if it belonged to all; no one keeps track of who gets or takes how much. If 
food is the means used, a participation incentive is an open buffet, or a family dinner 
where one person dishes out food in a way that signals that everyone is part of the 
family and that the food is for all (even if it is limited); while in a balancing scheme 
everyone gets, for example, exactly one sandwich and one drink. 
Proportional incentive schemes in market pricing relations  
Market pricing relationships consist of coordination with respect to some socially 
constituted ratio, rate, or proportion. Proportionality motivation, closely resembling need 
for achievement, is behind market pricing. It need not involve selfish utility maximization.   
 
Proportional incentives are the congruent schemes. They consist of acts and 
expressions that are given in a ratio according to the amount that the recipient 
contributed to the coordinated activity – whether measured in time, pieces, effort, 
efficiency, impact, or on some other dimension denominated in rational numbers. A 
proportional incentivizer can multiply the value of each different kind of contribution by 
its magnitude, then add them together to compute the total – and then calculate the 
amount of an incentive that is qualitatively distinct from the incentivized contribution, but 
fungible with it. So everything being coordinated is measured in the common currency 




incentive. An example of proportional incentives is piece rate pay, where the person is 
paid in proportion to his productivity. 
1.3 Practices and constructs corresponding to the four incentive schemes  
A look at the empirical and theoretical literatures shows that the principal ways of 
incentivizing indeed correspond to the four incentive schemes we just introduced. Table 
1 shows that the four schemes help us classify the major incentive ‘types’ in formal 
organizational life, such as, respectively, long-term or even ‘lifetime’ employment, (one 
kind of participation incentive), discretionary bonuses and promotions (one kind of 
hierarchy incentive scheme), profit sharing (where equal splits are a balancing scheme), 
and piece rates (one kind of proportional scheme). It also indicates in informal 
coordination efforts some of the main ways of incentivizing that respectively correspond 
to each of the four schemes. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Several major social psychological theories have conceptualized phenomena that 
approximately correspond to the four schemes of relational incentives theory.  
 
In their classic theory, French and Raven (1959; Raven, 1993) use the term “power” to 
encompass all kinds of social influence. One mechanism is “referent” power, in which a 
person seeks to conform to a group that they belong to, or wish to join; this corresponds 
closely to our participation scheme. Using behaviorist concepts, French and Raven also 
identify legitimate “reward” and “coercive” processes in which a person exerts influence 
by providing reinforcements such as piece rate payments; this corresponds to our 
proportionality scheme, in which the rate and intensity of behavior that an incentive 
yields depend on the rate of reinforcement, positive or negative (this later became 
known as Herrnstein’s [1970] matching law, or the law of effect). Raven (1993) also 
describes influence based on legitimate expectations of reciprocity (more or less 




based on Weber’s (1978) conceptualization of obedience to the will of a legitimate 
authority (our hierarchy scheme).   
 
Social and organizational justice researchers have also identified at least three of the 
four incentive schemes, if one grants that resource allocations often involve decisions 
about incentives to motivate potential recipients. Equity theory posits that people 
generally feel that certain resources ought to be distributed in proportion to what each 
person contributed (our proportional scheme). Social and organizational justice 
researchers have also shown that, depending on the circumstances, people may judge 
that it is just to make an even distribution of certain resources, giving each member of a 
group the same (the balancing scheme). They have moreover shown that sometimes 
people judge that it is just to distribute certain resources according to need. This is close 
to the participation scheme. (The difference is that participation incentives do not 
involve metering and tracking the incentive use at all. But from the observer’s point of 
view, participation incentives are often actually ‘consumed’ according to ‘need’.) These 
are the three distributions that have been the focus of most social and organizational 
justice researchers, though some researchers have listed others (see Cropanzano et 
al.’s 2007 review). It is somewhat surprising that they have given comparatively little 
consideration to the ubiquitous distributions based on authority and rank – though in 
many circumstances people consider hierarchical schemes the most just. Table 2 is a 
summary of how these and other social psychological concepts correspond to the four 
incentive schemes.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Researchers studying individual differences in trait motivation have also indirectly dealt 
with three of the four schemes. Although nearly everyone is inherently motivated to 
engage in all four fundamental types of social relationships, and hence is sensitive to all 




type of relationship (Caralis & Haslam, 2004; Haslam, 2004b; Haslam & Fiske, 1999; 
Haslam, Reichert, & Fiske, 2002; for a comprehensive overview, see Strasser, 2013). 
We posit that the constructs of intimacy motivation (McAdams, 1988, 1989), need for 
affiliation (Hill, 1987), and need to belong (Leary et al., 2013), correspond to increased 
sensitivity to participation schemes (with different needs operative in more or less 
different contexts). Individual motivation to respond to hierarchy incentives is closely 
related to the constructs for need for power, authoritarian personality, and social 
dominance orientation (Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; McAdams, 1988; Adorno et al, 
1950; Pratto et al, 1994). Sensitivity to proportional incentives resembles need for 
achievement – the need to rationally calculate the expected utilities of the options for 
social coordination, using a single comprehensive fungible metric (Atkinson & Feather, 
1966; McClelland, 1976; McClelland et al., 1953). Table 3 summarizes how these 
individual differences in trait motivation align with sensitivity to the three respective 
schemes.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Scholars studying incentives in economics, management, and organizational behavior 
have also repeatedly and independently observed the four incentive schemes of our 
theory. They have usually considered incentives in one specific field (e.g., the labor 
market or education), often without discussing the generality of the underlying incentive 
structure. A few scientists have recognized all four schemes in one domain of sociality, 
but without appreciating that they all operate to enable coordination across all domains. 
Many researchers have identified one incentive scheme, or contrasted a pair of 
schemes – without considering all four. Other researchers have made binary 
distinctions that conflate schemes that are differently structured and hence are effective 
in different kinds of relationships; they may treat all ‘social’ incentives as functionally 
identical, or group all ‘economic’ or ‘monetary’ incentives together. Many of the parallels 




four schemes. In management, for example, Ouchi (1979) discussed three 
fundamentally different mechanisms by which teams and organizations distribute 
rewards emanating from joint work: markets where individual contributions are precisely 
measured and rewarded (in our terms, proportional incentive schemes); Weberian 
bureaucracies where ‘superiors’ evaluate, direct, and, we conjecture, reward 
‘subordinates’ (related to hierarchy schemes); and clans where ‘socialization practices’ 
make ‘members’ adopt and value a shared mindset and identity. (While Ouchi did not 
study incentives, we can identify the rites and ceremonies he mentions as practices that 
create participation incentives). Similar parallels can be seen in the work done by 
organizational behavior scholars Trice and Beyer (1984), who described rites of 
integration to “encourage and revive common feelings” (p. 657; in our terms, 
participation schemes), rites of enhancement that "enhance social identities and their 
power" (p. 657; hierarchy incentives), and conflict reduction rites that are meant to 
“assure equal turns” and “minimize symbols of status differences” (p. 662; balancing 
schemes). In economics, Prendergast’s (1999) analysis of the provision of incentives in 
firms discusses proportional schemes such as piece rates, balancing schemes such as 
even splits of profits, hierarchy schemes such as discretionary incentives awarded by 
the supervisor, and participation schemes such as company-wide profit-sharing 
schemes “where the benefits of increased effort are shared with often thousands of 
others” (p. 10). Table 4 summarizes this research and identifies some other instances 
where scholars have independently discovered subsets of our four schemes.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Beyond all of the correspondences between the four incentive schemes and constructs 
in the fields of research discussed above, there are even broader connections across 
entire literature streams and recurrent topics in the social sciences, as Table 5 displays 




citizenship). This shows the fundamental importance of the four schemes and their 
relevance for any social scientist studying incentives.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
By displaying the four distinct incentive schemes as they are used in different spheres 
of social life and studied in different literatures, all of these tables make the fundamental 
point that schemes matter – and that they can and should be analyzed separately from 
the means.  
1.4 Incentive means 
Previous research has strongly focused on the means that people use to incentivize: the 
medium of the incentivizing act, and money in particular (e.g., Deci, 1971; Frey, 1997; 
Deci et al., 1999; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a; Cameron et al., 2001; Prendergast & 
Stole, 2001; Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Vohs et al., 2006; DeVoe & Iyengar, 2010; 
Lacetera et al., 2013; Frey & Gallus, 2017). We argue that the entity that is given to the 
incentivized person is not in itself crucial to its effectiveness or backfiring. What 
ultimately matters is the incentivizing scheme. Any means can be used in any scheme.  
 
For example, when Fiske lived in Africa, when he visited a village family for the first 
time, his host often presented him with a live chicken. Looking back on this, we can 
identify the chicken as an incentive. Before he knew the cultures, Fiske did not know if 
the chicken was a participation incentive intended to make him want to join the 
community. Or was it a hierarchy incentive, showing deference and offering him a 
superior position in the hierarchy – or, conversely, an act of largesse from the host, 
asserting superiority over Fiske? It could have been a balancing incentive, inviting an 
equality matching relationship in which he should (after some culturally apt interval of 
time) return a chicken of the same kind. Or it might have been an offer of sale, for which 
proportional payment was expected (in currency or in barter goods), offered in the hope 




schemes. Until you identify the scheme – which requires knowledge of the culture – you 
do not know how the means (the chicken) is intended. 
 
Certain means may be cues of one relational model or another – e.g., money for market 
pricing, trophies and titles for authority ranking, lottery tickets for equality matching, 
flowers for communal sharing. This is in line with previous work that suggests that 
‘economic incentives’ (money) may backfire by signaling that the relational coordination 
is a market pricing transaction and not a ‘social exchange’, and by reducing the giver’s 
ability to signal her knowledge of the recipient’s preferences (e.g., Kreps, 1997; 
Prendergast & Stole, 2001; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Bowles, 2016). 
 
But it is important to note that people also use other cues to identify the predominant 
relational model in a given coordination, such as other artifacts in use, surrounding 
architecture, and role terms (e.g., ‘boss’ and ‘subordinate’). The means are just one of 
the cues, and they vary according to activity and culture. Even money, the canonical 
market pricing means, is fruitfully used in communal sharing relationships. This is 
powerfully shown by Zelizer’s (1994) research about ‘gift money’, which describes how 
“families, intimate friends, and businesses likewise reshaped money into its supposedly 
most alien form: a sentimental gift, expressing care and affection. … [G]ift money 
circulated as a meaningful, deeply subjective, nonfungible currency, closely regulated 
by social conventions. At Christmas, weddings, christenings, or other ritual and secular 
events, cash turned into a dignified, welcome gift almost unrecognizable as market 
money” (p.139). Likewise, awards, the canonical authority ranking means, can foster 
communal sharing relationships – and thus motivate greater effort on behalf of the 
group. This is supported by evidence from a field experiment conducted on Wikipedia 
(Gallus, 2017), which found that symbolic awards had significant and long-lasting 
effects, motivating new editors to remain active contributors. Evidence from recipients’ 
written reactions to the awards shows that one mechanism behind the effects was an 





These examples illustrate that the means are only one among many cues of the 
relationship. It is the way in which the means are used (the scheme), in conjunction with 
the relational model underlying the activity, that determines the effects of incentivizing. 
Whatever the activity or the culture, this structural congruence is the determining factor.  
2. Congruence and Incongruence 
2.1 The importance of congruence between incentive schemes and 
relational models  
What is crucial for coordination is that the people interacting do so with reference to the 
same relational model, implemented in the same manner (Fiske & Haslam, 2005). 
Relational models generate expectations about others’ behaviors and motives. But 
there is often some uncertainty about the relational model that different persons who are 
coordinating an activity are willing to have, or that they believe they do have. Using and 
responding to incentives is an important way for people to signal their relational beliefs 
and preferences.  
 
To see why congruence and incongruence of incentives and relationships matter, we 
need to start from the premise that people care strongly about social relationships. 
Relationships can be powerfully motivating ends in themselves (Fiske, 1991, 1992). 
This is consonant with a major theme in the social sciences, such as Adam Smith’s 
(1759) writing about man’s “natural” desire to be loved; Harsanyi’s proposition that 
“social acceptance” is one of the two dominant interests explaining people’s behavior, 
besides economic gain (1969:524); the research on social identity theory and identity 
economics that shows the importance of group memberships and identities (Tajfel et al., 
1971: Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Akerlof & Kranton, 2000); or Baumeister and Leary’s 
argument that “the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive 




social exchange that consider ‘relationships’ instrumentally, as a means to an end (e.g., 
Baker et al., 2002), we consider social relationships as ends in themselves. 
 
Congruent incentives generally motivate greater effort and commitment by reinforcing 
and evoking congruous relational motives, and thus reinforcing the relationship. 
Participation incentive schemes reinforce the unity motives undergirding communal 
sharing relations, hierarchy incentives reinforce the hierarchy motives in authority 
ranking relations, balancing incentives reinforce the equality motives in equality 
matching relations, and proportional incentives reinforce the proportionality motives in 
market pricing relations. When people behave in ways that reinforce the predominant 
relational model, mutual commitment to the relationship increases, resulting in greater 
effort and commitment to the joint activity. 
 
Incongruence in the use of and response to incentives is one important way that 
relational motives are violated and coordination breaks down. The mechanisms behind 
such breakdowns are both cognitive and emotional. They are fundamentally different 
from those in some prominent earlier theories about incentives, which focus on how the 
incentivized person perceives a task or how she perceives herself, asocially (e.g., Deci, 
1971; Bénabou & Tirole, 2003). Relational incentives theory is not concerned with cases 
where people lose interest in the task (although that may be a result of the decreased or 
changed relational motivation underlying task engagement). Nor does our theory 
concern the inferences that people draw about their own abilities or motivations, or 
about the incentivizer’s beliefs about those. Instead, the mechanisms we are theorizing 
concern relational motives that depend on the form of relationship that the incentivizer 
and the incentivized person perceive or prefer.  
 
If we accept that incentives and the responses to them signal the involved persons’ 
beliefs and preferences about relational models, we begin to see an important exception 




invitation to shift to a new and mutually preferred mode of relating. To understand when 
incongruent incentive schemes successfully facilitate a shift to a different relational 
model, we need to understand what leads to congruent and incongruent incentivizing. 
2.2 Antecedents of congruent and incongruent incentivizing 
People commonly offer congruent incentive schemes, doing so because they intuitively 
and correctly perceive incentivizing as an aspect of the social relationship that 
coordinates the incentivized activity.  
Yet there are many conditions under which people offer incongruent incentive schemes. 
What are the factors that lead to incongruent incentivizing? These antecedents affect 
the response we may expect from the incentivized person.  
An incentivizer may offer an incongruent scheme primarily because of their explicit or 
implicit beliefs: perceptions of the incentive and the activity, together with wider 
understandings of the social world. If their beliefs are correct, such that they recognize 
when a scheme is congruent or when it is incongruent, we will say that they offer the 
congruent or incongruent scheme “knowingly.”2 If the beliefs are incorrect, in the sense 
that their beliefs conflict with the beliefs of more knowledgeable participants or 
observers, we will say that they offer the congruent or incongruent scheme 
“unknowingly”. The person may also offer the scheme primarily because of their 
narrowly defined individual preferences or motives; we will call this “voluntary.” Or they 
may offer the scheme primarily because of the constraints they face, and hence, 
“involuntarily.” To simplify, we categorize as “involuntary” all actions resulting from 
factors outside the incentivized activity or apart from the person’s selfish individual 
 
2 By “correct” we mean only that their beliefs accord with the beliefs of knowledgeable people. There is no 
objective truth about these matters, so we could also describe beliefs of different persons as concordant or 
discordant. But usually there is a consensus among participants (along with observers; Caralis & Haslam, 2004; 




preferences, despite the fact that such factors may be internalized so that they do not 
subjectively feel like ‘external’ constraints. 
For clarity of exposition, we present these factors as dichotomies, while acknowledging 
that there may be intermediate cases. We also put aside the complexities of interactions 
among beliefs, preferences, and constraints. Also, although cognitive scientists have 
identified many ways of knowing, for present purposes we ignore those distinctions, and 
we will not consider partial knowledge.  
Considering incentive scheme choices as a result of knowing or unknowing, and 
voluntary or involuntary processes, allows us to recognize that there are many possible 
reasons for incongruent incentivizing. These include ideological stances that lead to 
misperceptions of the predominant relational model or incentive, and third-party 
relationships that act as constraints on the incentivizer (see the Supplemental Online 
Material for a comprehensive list of conditions that we propose can lead to incongruent 
incentivizing).  
For our purposes, the most interesting case of offering incongruent incentives is when 
the incentivizer intends to shift to another relational model. We posit that this intent will 
lead her to use an incentive scheme that is congruent with the desired relational model.  
Empirical evidence on factors affecting the choice of incentive schemes 
Empirically, the question of how individuals choose incentives is not widely researched. 
Even at the organizational level, firms’ incentive and contract design choices continue to 
pose major puzzles for researchers (we will return to some of these in section 3). While 
most of our theory’s predictions remain to be tested, below we present empirical 
evidence from anecdotes, experiments and observational data analyses, which support 






Examples of participation incentives used in an apparent effort to shift a relationship to 
communal sharing include the provision of free food and beverages to be festively 
consumed by all members of an organization. This uses a participation scheme in which 
the commensal eating signals that “we are a ‘family’, we did this together, and we will go 
on to succeed together.” Such incentives appear prominently in contemporary 
technology companies and co-working spaces (e.g., see Google’s statement of “How 
we care for Googlers”; or Segel et al., 2016, for details on co-working spaces.)  
 
Experimental evidence indicating that people use participation schemes to create 
communal sharing relations comes from Clark (1984), in whose study participants were 
asked to complete a number circling task with a confederate. They were unobtrusively 
given the choice to use pens of the same color, thereby obscuring individual 
contributions and credit, or pens of a different color. She found that male participants 
who may have hoped for communal relationships – potentially dating an attractive 
female confederate – were more likely to choose pens with the same color, compared to 
men working with an unavailable female partner. This may indicate that individuals who 
seek a communal sharing relationship forego tracking their relative contributions, 
preferring instead to share jointly in the credit and the reward, as a team. Further 
research by Clark and associates shows that when people want to become closer 
friends with someone, they offer help (Beck et al., 2017; Beck & Clark, 2009). This may 
be intended as a participation incentive to facilitate shifts from what are possibly equality 
matching relationships to communal sharing. 
 
For an example of balancing incentives used with an intent to shift to equality matching, 
consider companies where managers’ offices are brought to the same floor as those of 
employees, presumably to signal the desired change. Levine (1991) presented ample 
evidence of such measures that are used to “reduce the status differentials between 
workers and managers” in an effort to increase “group cohesiveness”. He cited Andrew 




organization to participate in decisions if the organization doesn’t separate its senior 
and junior people with limousines, plush offices and private dining rooms. Status 
symbols do not promote the flow of ideas, facts and points of view. So while our 
egalitarian environment may appear to be a matter of style, it is really a matter of 
necessity, a matter of long-term survival” (1983, p. 23). As argued by Levine and others, 
it is “cohesiveness considerations” that lead to the adoption of balancing schemes such 
as “egalitarian wages” and symbolic policies to reduce or eliminate status differentials.  
 
In contrast, hierarchy incentives are used if the goal is to shift a relationship to authority 
ranking. This is supported by research by sociologists who showed that award 
ceremonies such as the Grammy Awards are used to ‘shape a field’ by distributing 
prestige and channeling attention to create and foster authority ranking relationships 
(Anand and Watson, 2004, Anand and Jones, 2008). This is particularly interesting to 
observe in the arts, where many activities are not coordinated according to authority 
ranking. In the voluntary sector, organizations may introduce hierarchy incentives to 
reap the presumed benefits of greater control; so they create ‘managerial' roles with the 
right to decide over others’ rewards, possibly symbolized by job titles and other status 
symbols, as an attempt to shift certain relations among members of the organization 
towards authority ranking. 
 
Proportional incentives are used if the intent is to shift to market pricing, such as when a 
person insists on paying a former classmate in proportion to the time he spends 
repairing the person’s automobile. This can be particularly relevant in contexts where 
artifacts and architecture otherwise risk cuing a relational model that is not desired by 
one of the persons; consider sex workers or psychotherapists. In these cases, 
proportional incentive schemes such as time accorded to the client in proportion to 
payment may be used to maintain and emphasize a market pricing relationship when 




2.3 Responses to congruent and incongruent incentive schemes 
The consequences of congruent and incongruent incentive scheme use depend on the 
recipient’s beliefs, relational preferences, and the constraints they face. We adopt the 
same lens as above, considering knowing or unknowing, and voluntary or involuntary 
reactions. This draws attention to the fact that, besides intentional reactions (i.e., 
knowing and voluntary), which tend to be the focus of many researchers, there are 
cases where aspects such as constraints imposed by third parties or by institutions 
determine the response to the incentive. For instance, someone may accept an 
incongruent incentive if they believe important others want them to do so, even if they 
would personally prefer not to.  
 
We apply these three factors – beliefs, preferences, and constraints – to both the 
response to congruent incentive schemes and the response to incongruent schemes. 
The Supplemental Online Material (SOM) offers a compendium of the various possible 
and testable conditions. 
 
Accepting a congruent scheme is the default, typical response. However, a person can 
also reject a congruent scheme. This can be done intentionally (knowingly and 
voluntarily) to end a relationship or to shift to a new relational model (see SOM IV. A). 
Whether the shift to the new relational model succeeds depends on the reaction from 
the incentivizer. Consider a person who moves to a new neighborhood, hires a 
handyman living down the street, and that handyman rejects the proportional incentive 
scheme in an effort to shift the default, market pricing relationship to one of equality 
matching (“You can help me out next time”), or communal sharing (“Let’s just have 
dinner with the families”). If the incentivizer accepts the offer, further actions will follow 
that reinforce the new relational model. 
 
When offered an incongruent scheme, the incentivized person may reject it for several 




voluntary) is the most relevant for our purposes. The most common reason for such 
rejections is that the incentivized person perceives the incongruent scheme as a 
violation of the existing relational model, which hurts their relational motives and 
emotions. This, we posit, weakens or even terminates the existing relationship, leading 
to a coordination failure. Another, subtly different reason that can lead to the same 
outcome is that the incentivized person regards the newly proposed relational model to 
be improper, or that they otherwise strongly dislike it. Weaker negative responses may 
be expected if the incentivized person believes that the incongruent incentive was 
offered because of constraints acting on the incentivizer (i.e., involuntarily), or because 
of the incentivizer’s erroneous beliefs (unknowingly). If the incentivized person does not 
prefer the newly offered relational model, they will reject the offer. If they do prefer it, 
however, they may act to reinforce the shift by accepting the incongruent incentive and 
exerting effort in the activity.  
 
This is an instance of one of the most intriguing scenarios: the incentivized person 
accepts the incongruent incentive scheme (SOM section VI). As before, we focus on the 
intentional cases. The most important case is where the incentivized person also 
prefers the new relational model. If so, he will respond by accepting the incongruent 
incentive and exerting effort to signal his preference and foster the shift. Consider a 
worker who is offered the possibility to shift his contract from a proportional, hourly 
wage to a long-term employment contract with free family health insurance. He may 
perceive this as a participation incentive – a sign that he is now truly an integral part of 
the organization – and consequently exert greater effort to signal his commitment to the 
shift. This may also include effort on dimensions that are impossible for managers or 
others to observe.  
 
Other cases where an incongruent scheme is intentionally accepted include those 
where the incentivized person infers that the scheme was the result of constraints or 




where the incentivized person is able to transform the incentive scheme into a 
congruent one. For example, a soldier who fought in a communal sharing manner with 
his platoon is offered a distinction that would put him above the others. If the soldier 
prefers the old relational model of communal sharing, he may accept the reward ‘on 
behalf of his platoon’ and emphasize how they all ‘won together’. 
 
As we argue in this section, there are two cases where incentivizing can prompt a shift 
to a new relational model: when congruent incentive schemes are rejected (or 
modulated by the recipient), and when incongruent incentive schemes are accepted. 
So, it is both the incentivizer and the person being incentivized who can prompt a shift. 
  
The above discussion shows that incentivizing can lead to one of four main outcomes: 
(1) acceptance of a congruent incentive, resulting in a reinforcement of the relationship; 
(2) rejection (or modulation) of a congruent incentive in a manner or with a 
communication that invites a shift to a different relational model, or that provokes 
termination of the old relational model; (3) rejection (or modulation) of an incongruent 
incentive, in a manner or with a communication intended to weaken or terminate the 
existing relationship; (4) acceptance of the incongruent incentive, leading to a shift to a 
new relational model.  
 
In all instances, effects on effort in the coordinated activity, along with overall devotion 
and commitment to the group or organization, are to a considerable degree mediated by 
the incentivized persons’ engagement in the social relationship that organizes their 
coordination. The motivating effect of incentives is not simply a function of the material 
value or ultimate utility of the means used to incentivize. Indeed, the means that is given 
may have little effect in itself. Conversely, means with little material value may have 
great effects. What often matters is the social relational meaning of the incentive. If the 
incentivizing scheme reinforces an important, satisfying social relationship, old or new, 




incentivizing scheme undermines the relationship in which people are coordinating, they 
will become less engaged in the activity, work less hard, care less about the quality of 
their work, and be less concerned with the welfare of the group or organization, which 
they may even seek to leave. 
Empirical evidence on responses to incentives 
While most of our propositions about the response to incentive offers still need to be 
tested, below we present some of the empirical research that is in line with our theory, 
and that our theory newly illuminates. We begin with studies related to the negative and 
positive effects of incongruence and congruence, respectively. We end with studies 
suggesting that incentive schemes may indeed shift relational models. 
 
The social and organizational justice literature supports our arguments that congruence 
between incentive schemes and relationships is important, and that incongruence can 
backfire. (As discussed above, this holds insofar as resource allocations are intended to 
motivate people; though note that in many cases dealt with by organizational justice 
researchers, the incentivizer is the organization and the relations concerned are those 
among employees.) Deutsch (1985) prominently argued that pay dispersion reduces 
cooperation and that it can backfire when work is ‘interdependent’. This is consonant 
with our proposition that proportional or hierarchy schemes can be harmful if the 
appropriate relational model is equality matching or communal sharing. Subsequent 
empirical research provides substantial support for this (see Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983, for 
a review). For instance, Bloom (1999) showed a negative relationship between pay 
dispersion and performance among professional baseball teams, where we can expect 
that play (and some aspects of training) are coordinated through communal sharing and 
equality matching relationships.  
 
While this shows the backfiring effects of incongruence, other work in the justice 
literature supports our argument about the positive effects of congruence. Deutsch and 




requires cooperation (i.e., under conditions often governed by equality matching), 
compression of incentives (applying balancing schemes) tends to increase performance 
(e.g., Deutsch, 1988, Levine, 1991, Pfeffer, 1995, Shaw et al., 2002).  
 
The above evidence supports the conjecture that balancing schemes work and 
hierarchy schemes backfire in equality matching relations. More recent evidence shines 
light on other relational contexts, showing, for instance, that balancing incentives are not 
always the preferred incentive scheme: DeVoe and Iyengar (2010) provide evidence 
that people view it as less fair to distribute resources equally (applying a balancing 
scheme) when the predominant relational model is market pricing than when a different 
relational model may predominate. Their study suggests that people expect and prefer 
proportional schemes in market pricing relationships, where balancing schemes are 
deemed unfair. A recent field experiment in the trucking industry was able to study the 
effects of the same incentive scheme under different relational models in the same 
organizational context: Blader et al. (2020) showed that increasing the salience of 
proportional incentives (detailed performance statistics) backfired, but only in sites that 
had already started a process of culture change as part of a ten-year program that 
sought to create a “cooperation-based relational contract”. This program applied many 
practices that might have made equality matching or communal sharing the 
predominant relational model for coordinating many activities. Interestingly, the effects 
of the proportional scheme were positive in sites where people were still coordinating 
according to the old relational model, which we may presume to have mostly been 
market pricing. 
 
Outside of work contexts but still in the domain of resource exchange, Kim et al. (2018) 
showed that exact repayments harm communal sharing relationships (liking of a 
potential friend). In line with our theory, the authors argued that such petty behavior (in 




Interestingly, and supporting our conjecture that means matter less than schemes, the 
negative effects obtained for both money and time. 
 
Further support for our theory comes from research in economics and adjacent fields, 
which has shown that the use of performance-based pay can backfire. Such backfiring 
has largely been attributed to using the wrong means, and money in particular (e.g., 
Heyman and Ariely, 2004). Our theory suggests that it might have been the proportional 
incentive schemes that caused backfiring when used in the wrong relational context. 
Non-profit and academic contexts typically rely on communal sharing or equality 
matching (Aggarwal, 2004; McGraw et al., 2012), where proportional incentives are 
relationship-incongruent. Indeed, some of the seminal papers in this literature showed 
that proportional incentives backfired when used to motivate volunteer fundraising 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a), academic testing (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a), and 
child-care pick-up (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000b; for a review see Gneezy et al., 2011). 
Conversely, in market-pricing contexts, where proportional incentives are relationship-
congruent, proportional incentives typically motivate more effort than participation 
incentives (e.g., DellaVigna & Pope, 2018). This provides further support for our thesis 
that incentive schemes can backfire in contexts in which they are incongruent with the 
predominant relational model but that they are effective where they are congruent. 
 
Finally, we turn to our conjecture that incentive schemes can be employed to shift to a 
new relational model. One of the most well-known studies that can be reinterpreted in 
that light is the robbers’ cave experiment (Sherif, 1961). Initially, two groups of boys 
were in a “state of friction”, competing with members of the other group. Then the 
experimenters introduced “superordinate goals”, which effectively created participation 
incentives (e.g., jointly getting to watch a movie). These incentives shifted the relational 
model used to coordinate several activities from authority ranking (the ranking of the two 
groups resulting from winning vs. losing the contests) towards communal sharing. One 




prepare food together. “One camper said, ‘You never thought we'd be eating together?’ 
The reply was laughter” (p. 173).  
 
Further, anecdotal evidence of ‘steering and counter steering’ of relational models 
through incentive schemes comes from Wikipedia. The online volunteer community is 
often seen as a canonical example of the ‘peer production’ model, which is minimally 
hierarchical or even anti-hierarchical. But given the growing number of contributors, 
some had to be given greater decision rights, and so the role of “administrator” was 
created (Gallus & Bhatia, 2020). Yet, as is still highlighted in Wikipedia’s policy 
documentation, “Administrators were not intended to develop into a special subgroup. 
Rather, administrators should be a part of the community like other editors” (Wikipedia, 
2020). In an effort to maintain the communal mode while introducing the new position, 
founder Jimmy Wales announced his possible recourse to a balancing scheme: “I just 
wanted to say that becoming [an administrator] is *not a big deal*. I think perhaps I'll go 
through semi-willy-nilly [randomly] and make a bunch of people who have been around 
for a while [administrators]. I want to dispel the aura of "authority" around the position. 
It's merely a technical matter that the powers given to [administrators] are not given out 
to everyone” (Jimmy Wales in 2003, as cited in Wikipedia, 2020; emphasis added).  
 
We have argued that recipients, too, can use incentive schemes to steer relational 
models with the giver, but also their relations with third parties. In support of this, 
researchers have recounted many instances where individuals refused awards, or 
where they returned them in order to shape their relation to the giver (see Goode, 1978; 
Frey & Gallus, 2017; or Emerson’s “balancing operations” in power relations). In many 
instances, this rejection of a hierarchy incentive signals a refusal to enter an authority 
ranking relation with the giver (e.g., a head of state whose policy one objects to) and 
others in the activity. Thus, artists regularly protest the seeming imposition of rank by 




3. Some Implications and Applications  
Relational incentives theory draws on relational models theory, but it also goes far 
beyond it. Relational models theory has never explained just how people deploy 
relational models and maneuver within them to reach their goals (Fiske, 1991). That is, 
relational models theory does not have any theory of the intentional agent selecting, 
resisting, or being constrained to accept a given relational model, or seeking to change 
to another relational model. Relational models theory has long noted that when people 
aiming to coordinate use different relational models, they get confused, disappointed 
and hurt, angry, and condemn each other’s actions as transgressions of the respective 
relational models that they themselves are using to judge their coordination (Fiske, 
1991; Rai and Fiske, 2011). Taking offense because of this, the participants may 
terminate the relationship. But that is all that relational models theory says about these 
important cases; it has never shed light on what people do to resolve the clash of 
inconsistent relational models. Nor has it said much about when and why such 
inconsistencies occur. More broadly, relational models theory says next to nothing 
about process. Relational incentives theory addresses that gap, opening many new 
frontiers. 
 
Furthermore, relational incentives theory provides new explanations for several puzzles 
in different literatures of the social sciences, and it suggests new avenues for empirical 
work. To illustrate the breadth of puzzles and new questions the theory sheds light on, 
in what follows we cover issues of incentive design at the organizational level, as well 
as the more informal use of incentives by individuals, such as employees in self-
managed teams and private individuals in ‘peer production’ models such as Wikipedia 
(Benkler, 2006). Further streams of literature that our theory may help elucidate have 





Puzzle 1: Why are contracts often incomplete? 
One long-standing puzzle, particularly prominent in law and economics and in the 
incentives literature, has been the prevalence of “incomplete” and simple contracts 
(e.g., Macaulay, 1963; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1993; Eggleston, Posner, & 
Zeckhauser, 2000). Why is it that “most workers face simple compensation schemes in 
which rewards are insensitive to performance, at least over short periods” (Prendergast 
& Topel, 1993)? Why is it that “a traditional piece-rate system is rarely used” (Lazear, 
2018)? Why do organizations “frequently … reward people for membership (through 
pay tied to seniority, for example) rather than for performance” (Nadler & Lawler, 
1989:11)? Previously proposed answers include issues of measurability and verifiability 
of outcomes, uncertain future requirements, contracting costs, and bounded rationality 
(see Hart, 1995, and Tirole, 1999, for reviews).  
 
Our theory offers an additional reason for why contracts can be less complete and much 
simpler than standard theory would predict: “Incomplete” contracts that do not specify a 
proportional incentive scheme often serve to reinforce existing non-market-pricing 
modes of coordination, or they may invite a shift to non-market-pricing modes. Further, 
relational incentives theory also predicts the specific structure of the (simple, 
incomplete, non-proportional) incentive contracts we expect to be used instead. We 
predict that the alternative types depend on the incentivizer’s preferred relational model 
– the one they are trying to create. Thus, for example, paying employees “for 
membership” (Nadler & Lawler, 1989) can be a participation scheme that initiates a 
communal sharing relationship in the organization. But it only does so if employees 
perceive that the scheme indexes and effectuates their being a part of the whole. That 
is, it moves the relationship toward communal sharing only if they see that, rather than 
making hourly or performance-contingent payments in a proportional scheme that 
supports market pricing, the organization is assuring their needs with a long-term 
income. (Ouchi [1981] describes a salient example of a set of participation schemes that 




mutual responsibilities of employees to their corporation and the corporation to its 
employees, corporate concerned involvement in employees’ personal lives, and lifetime 
employment.)  
Puzzle 2: Why do entrepreneurs so often opt for even equity splits? 
Another puzzle comes from the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Wasserman, 2008; 
Kagan et al., 2020): Much attention has been put on the observation that founders 
frequently use balancing incentives (even splits) to allocate equity, despite the founders’ 
disparate added-value and opportunity costs. Previous research explains the 
prevalence of even splits as the result of widespread inequity aversion (Wasserman & 
Hellman, 2016). Our theory suggests alternative explanations that can be tested: (1) 
founders prefer even splits if they are friends or classmates guided by equality matching 
(in line with the results in Polcz, 2020, for music bands’ royalty contracts); (2) when co-
founders do not have an established relationship, they may use even splits if they aspire 
to form an equality matching relationship; and (3) in contrast to warnings that even splits 
are usually mistakes (e.g., Wasserman & Hellman, 2016), equality matching 
relationship-congruent incentives may result in high motivation, satisfaction, and 
commitment. In short, our theory implies that founders may use even equity splits 
because these are congruent with the type of existing relational model among them, or 
the one they would like to have. (A similar argument can be made for decisions about 
credit allocation among scientists, such as alternating the authorship order as Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky apparently did.) 
 
In this case as in others, the ‘right’ incentive scheme cannot be specified independent of 
the relational model that people are using to coordinate. And again, it appears that 
incentives work when they evoke, strengthen, or shift and align relational motives.   
 
Besides suggesting answers to unanswered existing questions, relational incentives 





Question 1: How do relational preferences and incentive schemes affect how 
individuals sort into activities, organizations, and occupations? 
Besides influencing existing relationships among employees and others, incentives play 
an important role in attracting people who are a good fit for the organization (e.g., 
O’Reilly et al., 1991; Lazear, 2018). As discussed above, it has been shown that people 
vary in their predominant relational motives: Some people may seek to coordinate in 
hierarchies, others may tend to quantify proportional contributions, while other people 
typically see the world as composed of in-groups and outgroups, needing to belong to 
their focal in-group (e.g., McClelland, 1975, 1976; Pratto et al., 1994; Haslam & Fiske, 
1999; Caralis & Haslam, 2004; Strasser, 2013). Thus, if homogeneity, or at least 
prevalence of a given proclivity, is recognized as favorable for the operations of the 
organization, regardless of the incentive means the organization uses, we would expect 
the organization to use congruent incentive schemes to attract suitable candidates. For 
example, we might expect participation schemes to be used by a service organization 
that needs employees who affiliate or closely identify with service recipients and fellow 
members of the organization. For the understanding of individual self-selection into 
organizations and occupations, this adds a heretofore unstudied dimension: people’s 
relational motives, such as need for affiliation or belonging, power motivation, and 
achievement motivation.  
Question 2: When are separable incentives needed, and when is the relationship 
itself a sufficient incentive?   
When one wants someone to do something, often an incentive is needed. But 
sometimes no incentive is needed – and the other person would be confused or 
offended if an incentive were offered. When the relationship itself is sufficiently 
important for its own sake, people often do what the other(s) want(s) without even being 
asked, let alone offered an incentive. The relationship is its own reward, or it is felt to be 
morally binding (see Weber, 1978, on legitimacy). Congruence in this limiting case 




and that motivates action to conduct and sustain the relationship – is the same as the 
type of relationship that the other(s) are engaged in and committed to.  
 
In an inherently highly motivating relationship, a person will often do what the other 
wishes without any need for that wish to be expressed. Indeed, it is a salient sign of 
devotion to know what the other wishes without being told, and to do it without being 
asked. When the battle situation suddenly changes, a soldier who is devoted to his 
commander might risk his life to acquire intelligence that the soldier knows his 
commander will want, even before the commander knows that he needs the 
intelligence. In doing what his duty demands, the soldier may risk his life without even 
any consideration of future reward, simply to do what a subordinate should, or to please 
his commander and protect his comrades. So the question is, when should an explicit 
incentive be offered, and when should one show that one trusts that the relationship 
alone is sufficient, and believes that the other is fully engaged and committed to it?   
Question 3: What goes on between the end points of the dimensions we treat as if 
they were dichotomies?   
Finally, relational incentives theory raises a great many questions about the subtleties of 
what we have, for the sake of parsimony, presented as if they were dichotomies: 
accepting and rejecting incentives, knowing and not knowing whether they are 
congruent, and selecting a response voluntarily or involuntarily. As indicated in section 
2, there are innumerable intermediate cases and ways of appearing to do one thing 
while actually doing something else, or being intentionally ambiguous about what one is 
doing, such as using indirect speech (Lee and Pinker, 2010). Cognitive scientists have 
shown that knowledge is not unitary: There are two ways of explicitly knowing (semantic 
and episodic), and several ways of implicitly knowing (including procedural competence, 
perceptual competence, classical conditioning, and operant conditioning). What are the 
consequences of knowing congruence/incongruence in different ways? Likewise, a 
person often has conflicting motives, including motives concerning morality, social 




unclear just what ‘individual (selfish) preferences’ are, and hence what ‘voluntary’ and 
‘involuntary’ are. So as the next frontier, relational incentives theory needs to go beyond 
any dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary. In addition, because of the nuances 
of realizing any relational model in any social interaction, sometimes there may be 
ambiguity or disagreement about whether a scheme is congruent with the relational 
model organizing the coordinated activity. What causes such ambiguity, and what are 
the consequences? These questions will be important and exciting to study.    
4. Incentives Sustain, Modulate, or Change Relationships 
Much of social life consists of maintaining or modulating social relationships, all the 
while trying to get others to do something. Incentivizing is central to both processes. 
People’s use of a particular incentive scheme not only signals the kind of social 
relationship that they expect, but in the long run partly determines the kind of 
relationship that they will have. The manner in which parents and teachers choose to 
incentivize children, how employers decide to incentivize workers, and the ways that 
governments select to incentivize citizens will shape our future social relationships and 
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Participation Hierarchy Balancing Proportional
Within firms, with money as 
means
Long-term employment and rare 
layoffs – when employees 
perceive themselves as a truly 
integral part of the organization. 
E.g., Japanese "Theory Z" 
business model where the firm 
takes care of its employees for 
life (Ouchi 1981)
Discretionary promotions and 
bonuses handed out by a 'boss'
Profit sharing schemes with even 
division.  Partnerships with even 
payouts (as, e.g., in many law 
firms)
"Pay for performance" (e.g., 
piece rates).  Hourly wage
Within firms, non-monetary 
means
Free family health insurance for 
all employees.  Free drinks, food, 
and events.  Free use of lounge, 
kitchen, gym, or other facilities.  
E.g., Hewlett-Packard's practices 
conveying the message of "being 
part of a family" (Baron & Kreps, 
1999: 38)
Discretionary non-monetary 
rewards (e.g., job titles and 
offices carrying prestige) 
conferred by a superior
Equal vacation length and equal 
number of paid 'personal days' 
off
Sabbatical for every seven years 
of teaching, fractionally divisible
Incentives for extreme self-
sacrifice: soldiers 
(e.g., Stouffer et al 1949; 
Moore & Galloway 1992; 
Costa & Kahn 2003)
Belonging to the group of 
comrades in arms.                         
“We discovered in that 
depressing, hellish place, where 
death was our constant 
companion, that we loved each 
other. We killed for each other, 
we died for each other, and we 
wept for each other.” (M & G 
1992 p. xviii)
Discretionary promotions with 
honors and privileges of rank
Equal number of rest and 
recreation days out of the war 
zone.  Turn-taking rotations to 





Joint experiential incentives (e.g., 
barbecue for a day of joint work).  
Free access to a cabin one helped 
build
Many instances of rewarding in 
families, where parents decide on 
which behaviors to reinforce
Turn-taking, random draws, even 
resource splits
Screen minutes per time spent 
cleaning up
Table 1. Examples of Common Phenomena Corresponding to the Four Incentive Schemes
Participation Hierarchy Balancing Proportional
French & Raven 1959: The 
bases of social power
Referent power (being the 
same or wanting to be)
Reward and coercive 
power (response in 
proportion to positive or 
negative reinforcement, 
respectively)
Raven 1993 (additions to 
French & Raven 1959): The 
bases of power: Origins 
and recent developments
Legitimate power from 
responsibility or 
dependence





Schwartz 1967: The social 
psychology of the gift          
Gift as origin and 
imposition of group 
identity
Gift as acceptance of 
social inferiority
Gift return following "rule 
of approximate 
reciprocity"




Cialdini 2008: Influence: 
Science and practice
Conformity with one's 
group or the group that 
one wants to join
Compliance with 
legitimate authority 




Deutsch 1975, Leventhal 
1976, Lerner 1977, 
Cropanzano et al. 2007:  
Social and organizational 
justice
Need Status, rank [infrequently 
and only cursorily 
considered by most 
justice researchers]
Equality Equity 
Table 2. How Social Psychological Conceptualizations of Incentives     
Align with The Four Schemes
Participation Hierarchy Balancing Proportional
Intimacy motivation 
(McAdams 1988, 
1989).                               
Affiliation motivation 
(Hill 1987).                         





McAdams 1988, 1989).           
Authoritarian 
personality F scale 
(Adorno et al 1950).           
Social dominance 
orientation (Pratto et 
al. 1994)
Achievement 
motivation (need to 




& Feather 1966, 
McClelland 1976, 
McClelland et al. 1953)         
Table 3. How Individual Difference Traits Align with The Four Schemes
Participation Hierarchy Balancing Proportional
Ouchi 1979: A conceptual framework 
for the design of organizational 
control mechanisms.  
Ouchi 1980: Markets, bureaucracies, 
and clans                                          
Incentives in "clans", such as 
"rituals and ceremonies 
rewarding those who display 
the 'right' attitudes and values"
Incentives in "bureaucracies", 
where superiors evaluate and 
reward subordinates
"Market" incentives that 
"precisely measure and reward 
individual contributions"
Trice & Beyer 1984: Studying 
organizational cultures through rites 
and ceremonials
"Rites of integration" (e.g., 
office Christmas parties to 
"encourage and revive common 
feelings…", p. 657); several of 
the other rites
"Rites of enhancement" to 
"enhance social identities and 
their power" (p. 657) 
"Conflict reduction rites" ("most 
of them use some method to 
assure equal turns at 
participation and use settings 
that minimize symbols of status 
differences", p. 662)
Ostrom 1990: Governing the 
Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions for Collective Action.
Ostrom et al. 1992: Covenants with 
and without a sword: Self-governance 
is possible
Free use of a resource held in 
common by members of a 
community      
Allocactions and penalties 
managed by a government 
authority 
Harvesting turns or equal 
allocations managed by an 
organization of peer harvesters
Proceeds from sale of harvest 
from privatized resources
Prendergast 1999: The provision of 
incentives in firms
Company-wide profit-sharing 
schemes, "where the benefits of 
increased effort are shared with 
often thousands of others" (p. 
10) – when employees perceive 
the scheme as a joint pool of 
resources from which they are 
paid simply for having been a 
part of the enterprise
Discretionary incentives 
awarded by the supervisor
Even splits of profits Piece-rate
Deci et al. 2001:
Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic 
motivation in education: 
Reconsidered once again
Rewards not contingent on task 
completion or performance,  
given simply for participation or 
engagement, when the task is 
the responsibility of a team




Rynes et al. 2005: Personnel 
psychology: Performance evaluation 
and pay for performance
Differentiated rewards, pay 
dispersion, especially where not 
based on "true performance 
differences or other acceptable 
equity considerations" (p. 586)
Even splits of profits Individual merit pay when based 
on measured performance
Kerr & Slocum 2005: Managing 
corporate culture through reward 
systems
"Hierarchy based" reward 
systems 
"Performance based" systems
Lazear & Shaw 2007: Personnel 
economics: The economist's view of 
human resources
The "hope of promotion" (p.95), 
where it involves discretion on 
the part of the superior
"Gainsharing", where payouts 
are even; pay compression 
aiming at equality
Individual performance bonuses
Lazear 2018: Compensation and 
incentives in the workplace
"Team-based incentives" 
(though allocation mechanism 
among team members is not 
considered)
Promotions and rewards based 
on subjective relative effort 
evaluation by a superior
"Team-based incentives" if 
evenly split
“Continuous” incentives: piece-
rate pay and time-based pay
Dohmen & Falk 2011: Performance 
pay and multidimensional sorting: 
Productivity, preferences, and gender
Fixed payment scheme (400 
points guaranteed)
Revenue sharing in which the 
dyad's earnings are divided 
evenly 
Piece rate (10 points per correct 
answer)
DellaVigna & Pope 2018: What 
motivates effort? Evidence and expert 
forecasts
Gift exchange treatment ("In 
appreciation to you for 
performing this task, you will be 
paid a bonus of 40 cents. Your 
score will not affect your 
payment in any way"); 
Task significance treatment 
("Your score will not affect your 
payment in any way. . . please 
try as hard as you can")
Treatments in which some 
participants are entered into a 
lottery where each has an equal 
chance of winning a payment
Piece rate treatments (e.g., "You 
will be paid an extra 1 cent for 
every 100 points that you 
score")
Kagan et al. 2020. Equity contracts 
and incentive design in start-up teams 
[four "contract archetypes" for co-
founder equity divisions emerged in 
these experiments]
Threshold vesting Difference vesting Equal-split contracts Proportional division
Table 4. Research and Theory Relating to the Four Incentive Schemes In 
Economics, Management, and Organizational Behavior
Participation Hierarchy Balancing Proportional
Loyalty, identification with the 
organization (e.g., Simon 1991, Akerlof 
& Kranton 2005)
X
Organizational citizenship (Organ 
1990) X
Awards (e.g., Gallus & Frey 2016), 
prestige (Goode 1978) X X
Leadership (e.g., Hermalin 2012) X
Principal-agent theory (e.g., Alchian & 
Demsetz 1972), transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975)          
X X
Team incentives, partnerships 
(e.g., Kandel & Lazear 1992) X
Exchange theory 
(Ekeh 1974, Befu 1977, Cook et al. 
2013, Cropanzano et al, 2017)
X
Adverse effects of monetary incentives 
(e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini 2000a,b)   X
Table 5. Connections to Other Constructs and Literatures
Supplemental Online Material 
How beliefs, constraints, and preferences influence  
the choice of congruent and incongruent incentive schemes  
and responses to them 
This compendium offers a list of testable propositions about factors influencing how 
people choose and respond to incentive schemes. The underlined parts denote the 
most important and novel cases. 
Offering incentives  
I. When will people be likely to offer congruent incentive schemes? 
Most of the time. This is the typical, unproblematic, default way to incentivize.  
People offer congruent schemes because incentive schemes are one aspect of 
social coordination of an activity, and in a given activity among a given set of 
people, it is simpler and generally expected to use one and the same relational 
model for as many aspects as possible.     
II. When will people be likely to offer incongruent incentive schemes?  
A. Knowingly and voluntarily
1
 
1. Desire to shift: When the incentivizer wants to shift to another relational model.   
2. Second-order normative beliefs: When the incentivizer believes (correctly or 
incorrectly) that others in the activity, in her role, or in her reference group, would 
offer it, and she does not want to be regarded as odd or different. 
 
1 We assume conscious intentionality. Because we imagine that people rarely offer an incongruent scheme 




3. Relationships with third parties: When the result of the incentive scheme is 
expected to create an especially pleasing social relationship with others 
(incentivized persons or people not engaged in the activity).   
B. Unknowingly and voluntarily 
4. Incorrect beliefs about the world: When the incentivizer has a strong monolithic 
ideological stance about how society works, strong folk psychological beliefs 
about basic human motives (‘everyone only does what they get paid for’), or a 
distorted stereotype of what motivates the people of a given culture, race, ethnic 
group, generation, profession, or other set of people. Or when the incentivizer 
over-generalizes from a previous, apparently successful incentivizing experience 
of her own, or that of a referent other.  
5. Idiosyncratic preferences and personality: When the personality of the 
incentivizer makes her especially motivated by one scheme, so she assumes 
that everyone finds that one scheme especially motivating, and she sees the 
social world through that lens. (Cf. social dominance orientation, achievement 
motivation, intimacy motivation, authoritarianism, and personality disorders.) 
6. Uncertainty: When the incentivizer is new to a particular activity or organization, 
or she otherwise lacks specific information about how this activity is coordinated 
in that context.    
7. Misperception of the incentive: When the incentivizer perceives the scheme 
differently than those whom she offers it to. That is, although informed 
participants or observers judge the scheme that the incentivizer is using to be 
incongruent with the relational model of the activity, the incentivizer misperceives 
the scheme as a congruent one.     
C. Knowing the incongruence, but involuntarily offering the scheme 
8. Third party constraints: When a third party, such as a boss, stockholders, voters, 




specific incentive scheme, without regard for how the people are actually 
coordinating this particular activity.     
9. Institutional constraints: When the law, regulations, collective bargaining 
contracts, or religion require a specific incentive scheme. 
10. Resource availability: When the incentivizer has only one obvious or available 
means (e.g., money or a meal) and takes it for granted that the use of that means 
implies using a particular incentive scheme. This can be because of past 
practice, or because the means seems to lend itself more readily to one scheme 
than another (e.g., when it is difficult to share a meal in a proportional manner).    
Responding to incentives 
III. When will people be likely to accept congruent incentive schemes?  
Most of the time. This is the typical, unproblematic response to congruence.  
IV. When will people be likely to reject congruent incentive schemes? 
A. Knowingly and voluntarily 
1. Desire to shift: When the incentivized person intends to propose a change in the 
relational model organizing the activity, rejecting the incentive in a manner that 
shows their intent to shift.  
2. Desire to weaken or terminate the relationship: When the incentivized person 
prefers to pull back from or end the existing relationship with the incentivizer.  
3. Second-order normative beliefs: When they believe (correctly or incorrectly) that 
others in the activity, their role, or their reference group, would reject it. 
4. Relationships with third parties: When the result of the rejection is expected to 
create a pleasing social relationship with others.   
5. Unattractive or offensive means: When the incentivized person is offended 
because they perceive the offer of an incentive as a sign of distrust in their 




factors, unrelated to relationship structures, make the incentive offer unattractive 
(e.g., the level of the proportional payment is deemed insufficient). 
B. Knowingly but involuntarily
2
 
6. Third party constraints: When a person or persons with whom they have an 
important social relationship regards the scheme and/or the relational model 
organizing the activity as wrong and wants them to reject it (or would want it if 
they knew.) Or when the incentive scheme risks creating an unwanted 
relationship with other persons.     
7. Institutional constraints: When the law, regulations, collective bargaining 
contracts, or religion require a different incentive scheme, or disallow use of the 
means. 
V. When will people be likely to reject incongruent incentive schemes?  
A. Knowingly and voluntarily 
1. Preference for the existing relational model: When the incentivized person(s) feel 
that the incongruent incentive scheme violates the relational model they are 
using and should be using to coordinate the incentivized activity, so the incentive 
scheme is a transgression of that relational model.  
2. Aversion to the proposed relational model: When they perceive the incongruent 
incentive scheme as an invitation to change the relational model coordinating the 
activity to a new relational model that they feel to be improper or illegitimate, or 
otherwise strongly disprefer.    
3. Inference about the incentivizer’s erroneous beliefs or constraints: When they 
infer that the incongruent incentive was offered because of erroneous beliefs 
(unknowingly) or because of constraints (involuntarily), and they prefer not to 
shift.    
 
2 The unknowing rejection of a congruent incentive seems to be a rare case; when it does occur, we suggest that its 




4. Inference about the incentivizer’s type: When they regard the incentivizer as 
unpredictable, crazy, or otherwise untrustworthy. 
5. Second-order normative beliefs: When the incentivized person(s) believe 
(correctly or incorrectly) that others in the activity, their role, or their reference 
group, would reject it. 
6. Relationships with third parties: When the result of the rejection is expected to 
create a pleasing social relationship with others.    
B. Knowingly but involuntarily
3
   
7. Under the same circumstances as when someone knowingly rejects a congruent 
incentive scheme: due to constraints imposed by third parties or institutions.  
VI. When will people be likely to accept incongruent incentive schemes?   
A. Knowingly and voluntarily 
1. Desire to shift or acceptance of shift: When the incentivized person(s) prefer or 
accept the new relational model.  
2. Inference about the incentivizer’s erroneous beliefs or constraints: When the 
incentivized person(s) infer that the incongruent incentive was offered because of 
erroneous beliefs (unknowingly) or because of constraints (involuntarily). If they 
merely accept the new relational model, this need not lead to a long-term shift in 
the predominant relational model. But if they prefer the new relational model, 
they can subsequently take action to signal their preference and reinforce the 
shift.      
3. Transformation of incentive: When they have the capacity to transform the 
incentive scheme into a congruent one. (See soldier example in text.)   
4. Second-order normative beliefs: When they believe that others in the activity, 
their role, or their reference group, would accept it. 
 




5. Relationships with third parties: When the result of the acceptance is expected to 
create a pleasing social relationship with others. 
6. Attractive means: When other factors, unrelated to relationship structures, make 
the incentive offer attractive (e.g., a high level of payment). 
B. Unknowingly but voluntarily
4
 
7.  Under the same circumstances as when someone unknowingly offers an 
incongruent incentive scheme: due to incorrect beliefs about the world, 
idiosyncratic preferences and personality, uncertainty in a novel activity or 
organization, or misperceptions of the incentive scheme.  
C. Knowingly but involuntarily 
8. Under the same circumstances as when someone involuntarily rejects a 
congruent incentive scheme: constraints imposed by third parties and institutions. 
9. Dependence: When they perceive themselves to be dependent on the incentive 
means or the continued relationship.  
 
 
4 With respect to consciously directed action, we do not think that it makes sense to describe accepting an 
incentive unknowingly and involuntarily, so we ignore this combination. 
